Todd Jacobson
NS&D Monitor
1/16/2015
Y-12/Pantex contractor Consolidated Nuclear Security is taking a “deliberate” approach to improving operations at the two sites, CNS Chief Operating Officer Morgan Smith said late last week in response to reports that federal managers had been unhappy with the pace of improvements. CNS developed an “operational excellence plan” last year in response to concerns raised by NNSA Production Office Manager Steve Erhart about abnormal operational events at Y-12. “Although we aspire to achieve immediate improvements, affecting long-entrenched standards and practices requires a sound strategy that is consistently and persistently implemented over time,” Smith said. “We want to avoid superficial solutions and ensure that operational excellence becomes part of our collective DNA.”
Smith said CNS agreed with observations made by the NNSA Production Office, which were revealed in a recently released Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board report. A Nov. 28 DNFSB memo indicated that NPO senior managers “expressed concern that the plan had not resulted in more immediate improvements in CNS operational performance. They cited the number and significance of recent events, and an observation that CNS line management had not responded to certain events with the appropriate urgency or self-critical tone.” CNS took over the Y-12 and Pantex contracts from B&W-led teams July 1.
‘We Are in This for the Long Haul’
Smith said the improvements were necessary and CNS has been “deliberate since assumption of the contract in developing a detailed understanding of the work environment and where change is needed, taking into account the lessons learned from previous incidents.” Smith added, “Our initial plan was intentionally designed at a high level to help us avoid any unintended consequences from implementing change. We are in this for the long haul and want to ensure that solutions implemented will stand the test of time.”
According to the DNFSB, CNS developed a “very high level” plan that included five phases: “develop a detailed understanding of work environments and previous issues, establish a vision of excellence, communicate and train at all levels, improve processes and develop metrics to drive performance excellence, and implement continuous learning and improvement.” A systems review of recent incidents had begun, the DNFSB said, as had the development of an employee communications strategy, leadership development training, and the development of line organization standards.
‘Abnormal’ Events Sparked Concern
Erhart’s original letter outlining the NNSA’s concerns was sparked by a series of “abnormal” security and safety events, some of which had not been made public. Among the security issues raised in Erhart’s letter was a June 9 incident in which a bag containing an enriched uranium metal plate was found in an unauthorized storage area at Y-12. Less than a month later, two pellets of highly enriched uranium were found misplaced in an area of the 9212 complex, the uranium production hub for the Oak Ridge plant.
On July 21, production workers also identified classified parts that were being prepared for disposal as unclassified waste. In another, separate incident that month, classified and unclassified wastes were co-mingled at the site, and investigations determined that it was not an isolated incident. The result was a temporary suspension of all off-site waste shipments. Other events included failure to secure an area and closing a security portal without setting the alarm system; an unauthorized personal weapon inside the high-security Protected Area at Y-12; and an “inventory discrepancy.” Since then, there was a chemical spill at Y-12’s Purification Facility in December that has shut down the facility.
