Brian Bradley
NS&D Monitor
1/16/2015
The head of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control of the Russian Foreign Ministry this week said Russia could revise its commitment to bilateral nonproliferation and disarmament, including the New START Treaty, the main agreement governing U.S.-Russian bilateral nuclear arms reductions, because of what Russia deems “unfriendly” U.S. actions, according to a Jan. 13 RIA Novosti article. “We have not taken any concrete steps in this direction, but I am not ruling out the possibility that Washington could force us to do so, to adjust our policy in this area," the article quotes Mikhail Ulyanov as saying. The Russian Foreign Ministry even Tweeted the article after its publication.
State Department Responds
In response to Russia’s threat, the State Department pointed to the benefits of New START in an email to NS&D Monitor. “The New START Treaty enhances national security and strategic stability for both the United States and Russia, and both countries are successfully implementing the Treaty’s inspection regime,” a State Department spokeswoman wrote. “Current tensions with Russia notwithstanding, the importance of both the verification and confidence provided by data exchanges and on-site inspections under the Treaty and the security and predictability provided by verifiable mutual limits on strategic weapons are of value to both countries.” New START limits the number of deployed ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to 700, the number of deployed nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers to 1,550, and deployed and non-deployed launchers to 800. The treaty is set to expire on Feb. 5, 2021, but can be extended to 2026.
Russian-Language Article Criticizes U.S. Further
A longer version of the article published on the Russian-language version of RIA Novosti’s website cited accusations by Ulyanov that the U.S. had violated the INF Treaty, saying that “so-called” U.S. missile defense targets, deployment of drones and plans to use the Mk41 vertical launching system—used to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles—on land, all fall under provisions of the INF Treaty. Signed in 1987, the INF Treaty required destruction of U.S. and Russian ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support equipment within three years after the treaty entered into force.
Bill Schneider, a defense analyst and Hudson Institute senior fellow, noted the launch system is used to launch weapons other than the Tomahawks, including missile defense systems like the Aegis Ashore. “I think what [the Russians are] doing is trying to stitch all these concerns together—that is their rejection of our critique on INF compliance with their concern on missile defense deployments and now coupling that to the provisions of the New START agreement,” he said.
Ulyanov also said the U.S. has recently characterized Russia as its main opponent, an identification he called “quite strange,” but did point to stability provided by the New START Treaty. “Both the American and the Russian sides acknowledge that the process is moving forward; neither side has complaints against the other. And technical issues are resolved in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the next session of which will be in February. … We think that so far no circumstances have not arisen that force us to review our attitude to this treaty," Ulyanov was quoted as saying in the Russian-language version of the article.
Russia’s Threat Not Far From Norm
Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association, connected the threat of New START de-committal with U.S.-Russian tensions over Ukraine, and noted in an email to NS&D Monitor that Russia had displayed similar behavior after its annexation of Crimea last March, when unnamed Russian Defense Ministry officials told national media outlets that Moscow was prepared to suspend receiving New START inspection teams because U.S. and NATO “threats” over Russia’s Ukraine policy were considered an “unfriendly gesture.”
Since then, Reif noted, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said Russia did not actually plan to suspend inspections, reiterating Russia’s commitment to New START. “Actions threatening New START would be short-sighted and dangerous,” Reif wrote. “The treaty limits and verification provisions put a bound on the current tensions between the two countries and constrain what can be achieved by strategic nuclear arms competition. A world without the treaty would be a less secure world.”
Will Russia Actually Back Out?
Reif said the article most likely was more of a posture than an actual threat, but is nevertheless concerning. Schneider said Russia would most likely stick with New START, as the treaty limits 700 deployed ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, and 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, has actually allowed Russia to build up nuclear forces in those categories after the treaty entered into force. When the treaty entered into force, Russia retained 521 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, and 1,537 deployed nuclear warheads on those delivery platforms.
