Brian Bradley
NS&D Monitor
12/19/2014
President Barack Obama is required to submit quarterly reports to Congress detailing whether it remains in the national security interests of the U.S. to remain committed to the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty as long as Russia remains in noncompliance with the agreement, according to the Ukraine Freedom Support Act, a bill President Barack Obama signed on Dec. 18. “This is not uncommon when it comes to Congressional oversight of arms control agreements,” Kingston Reif, Director of Disarmament/Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association, told NS&D Monitor this week.
Reif pointed to the Congressional resolution for consent to the New START Treaty, which also requires reports examining prudence of U.S. adherence to that treaty in case Russia becomes noncompliant. Passed by the Senate during a rare Saturday session on Dec. 6, the bill would require Obama to demand that Russia comply with the INF Treaty and order the country to "completely and verifiably eliminate the military systems that constitute a violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty.”
Obama signed the bill after receiving it Dec. 16. In addition to INF compliance measures, the bill also OK’s economic sanctions on Russia and authorizes diplomatic and military assistance for Ukraine. The White House issued a statement on Dec. 18, stating that Obama does not currently intend to impose additional sanctions on Russia.
Russia Has Accused U.S. of Violating INF
The U.S. has accused Russia of developing a missile capable of hitting targets within 500 and 5,500 kilometers, a range prohibited by the treaty. In turn, Russia has claimed that the U.S. has violated the INF Treaty, alleging specifically: The U.S. has tested missile defense systems that have “similar characteristics” to intermediate-range missiles, has produced armed drones that are covered by the treaty’s definition of ground-launched missiles, and plans to deploy MK-41 launch systems in Poland and Romania. “These launch systems can launch intermediate-range cruise missiles, but their ground-launched version can be perceived as a direct violation of the INF Treaty,” the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in July.
Speaking Dec. 17 to reporters on the sidelines of an event at the Brookings Institution focusing on U.S. arms control policy, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller said an important first step of the INF compliance process would be a Russian acknowledgement of their development of an intermediate-range missile, a munition whose existence Moscow has thus far denied. “It’s clear that there’s an effort to basically take us to task for our ‘alleged violations’ of the INF Treaty, but there’s no willingness to talk about our concerns, and that’s the crux of the issue,” she said, adding that the U.S. has made its case to Russia that it is not in violation of INF, and is ready to continue discussing its point of view with Moscow. “We’re just not getting anything back,” Gottemoeller said.
Obama Would Be Required to Submit Quarterly Reports to Congress
The bill—which the House passed last week—among other actions, requires Obama to submit quarterly reports to Congressional committees detailing his and U.S. allies’ efforts to ensure accountability and to enforce the missiles’ elimination, as well as the President’s assessment of whether it is in the U.S. interest to remain party to the INF Treaty while Russia stays in noncompliance, and notification of any Russian deployment of a ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile system in the range of 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
Under the legislation, Obama is required to send the unclassified reports to the Senate committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the House committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. The bill also requires Obama’s reports to include a plan developed by Secretary of State John Kerry, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to verify that Russia has “fully and completely” dismantled any intermediate-range ground-launched cruise or ballistic missiles, including details on facilities that inspectors need access to, people inspectors need to talk with, how often inspectors need access, and costs of the verification regime.
Should the U.S. Stay in Compliance?
Reif said the bill’s INF section is consistent with the Administration’s henceforth approach to bring Russia back into compliance with INF, and that he thinks it is in the current U.S. security interest to remain party to the treaty, backing up ACA’s July-stated position that U.S. withdrawal from the treaty would give Moscow a moral basis to produce intermediate-range weapons. “The United States should continue to publicly and privately call out Russia for its violation and press Russia to return to compliance,” Reif wrote in an email to NS&D Monitor. “Washington should also consider calling a meeting of the Special Verification Committee established by treaty. If this proves unfeasible, the two sides should find some other forum where technical experts can discuss the specifics of the Russian violation and ways to bring Russia back into compliance.”
Michaela Dodge, Policy Analyst for Defense and Strategic Policy at the Heritage Foundation, also told NS&D Monitor during a phone call this week that convening the Special Verification Commission could be a good option to foster INF compliance. She cited Gottemoeller’s statement at a recent House Joint Subcommittee hearing that the U.S.’ preferred forum is Obama’s and Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey’s ongoing compliance discussions with Russian officials, noting that the “important” forum was merely one of many compliance tools that the U.S. should consider. “For technical discussion of violation, those discussions should be held in that [Special Verification] Commission, too,” Dodge said. “And it’s one missed opportunity when you can be calling out Russia on the violation and you are not.” She also highlighted other options the Administration hasn’t considered, such as suspending the treaty, withdrawing from the treaty and linking New START and INF Treaty implementation. “Either we are serious about treaty compliance, or we are not,” she said. “And if we are not, it calls into question future arms control negotiations and current arms control treaty implementation.”
In his email, Reif called on the U.S. to press its allies and other interested parties such as China, to raise the issue with Russia, and said it’d be important for the U.S. to demonstrate its commitment to defense of allies against intermediate-range missiles, but he cautioned against the U.S. taking “hasty actions,” such as U.S. deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, that would threaten the treaty and “lead to a counterproductive escalatory cycle.”
