DNFSB makes agency fixes, but needs members, GAO finds

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) has tackled all but a few third-party recommendations to improve its culture over the past decade but suffers from a depleted board, according to a new report. 

Progress is tough with the five-person board probably slipping to one member, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) said in its report made public Thursday. “For example, as of August 2025, the board was below quorum, with two of five seats filled and one member’s term expiring in October 2025,” 

The GAO was referring to DNFSB Acting Chair Thomas Summers, whose term expires Oct. 18. The departure would leave Patricia Lee as the lone remaining member of the board in charge of a 110-person staff providing independent oversight and advice to the Department of Energy’s nuclear facilities.

“The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2020 restricted board members from serving past their terms in most cases,” GAO wrote. “With one seated member, the board’s authority will be limited.”

The board has enjoyed a full five-member contingent since 2017, according to the report. DNFSB members are first nominated by the president and then require Senate confirmation. A board member is nominated for a single 5-year term, and the clock starts when the prior term for that seat expires even if that seat is vacant.

In 2018, assessments by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspector General found many shortcomings in DNFSB’s management “that created a dysfunctional organizational culture and performance problems,” GAO said.

The new GAO audit, called for by a Senate report in a fiscal 2025 appropriations bill, says progress is reflected in DNFSB’s improved results in employee satisfaction surveys.

NAPA reported that DNFSB’s overall employee engagement and satisfaction score for 2017 was only 39 out of 100. But the score rose to 70 in 2024, GAO said.

DNFSB has “fully” addressed 36 of the 41 recommendations from those outside reviews, including one in 2015 by GAO itself, GAO said. But issues remain with its “human capital plan,” the Congressional auditor said. The safety board needs to clarify “who is responsible for achieving the plan’s stated goals, how they will achieve it, and by when,” GAO said.

In keeping with the human capital plan, DNFSB hired an executive director of operations.

But current and former DNFSB officials told GAO that “delegating the appropriate authority to the first director, and then filling the position again after the first director resigned in August 2022.”

The current executive director of operations, Mary Buhler, was hired by DNFSB in December 2023, and then-Chair Joyce Connery signed a memorandum delegating functions to the position in January 2024.

GAO conducted its performance audit from December 2024 to September 2025. In its comments, DNFSB concurred with GAO’s findings.

“The DNFSB fully concurs with the findings and recommendations presented in your audit report,” Buhler said in the board’s official July 23 response, subsequently made part of the final GAO report. DNFSB will use the recommendations to help further improve its operations, Buhler said.

In 1988, Congress set up DNFSB “as external to and independent from DOE,” GAO said. Congress envisioned DNFSB as “a body of seasoned experts who would serve as honest and balanced brokers of technical information.”

While DNFSB lacks actual regulatory power, “its enabling statute contains elements designed to ensure that the agency’s advice carries significant weight and cannot be easily dismissed or disregarded,” GAO said. When the board makes recommendations, the Secretary of Energy must publicly respond in writing.

DNFSB oversight of DOE “is crucial as DOE expands the nuclear security enterprise and increases its operational tempo to support the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile and address defense-related waste,” GAO said in the report.

In the past couple of years, DNFSB took issue with a DOE policy at the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility project located at the Savannah River Site in Aiken, S.C., GAO said. The DOE policy expected workers would “use their senses to detect a spill or fire” and evacuate their workplace at the plutonium processing facility. 

“DNFSB noted that this assumption of worker self-protection was not aligned with other DOE plutonium processing facilities’ design assumptions and requested that DOE provide a written report and briefing on the issue,” GAO said.