Todd Jacobson
NS&D Monitor
5/9/2014
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is pressing the National Nuclear Security Administration to not let oversight slip with transition activities to a new contractor Consolidated Nuclear Security at the Y-12 and Pantex nuclear weapons plants ongoing. In an April 30 letter to new NNSA Administrator Frank Klotz, DNFSB Chairman Peter Winokur outlined a handful of priorities at each site for the NNSA to watch during the changeover to a new contractor. CNS began transition in March, and is expected to take over management of the sites from Babcock & Wilcox-led teams July 1. “The transition period for the new M&O contract is a time of significant change that requires rigorous field-based oversight by NNSA and the M&O contractor organizations,” Winokur wrote. “… Ongoing safety programs and improvement initiatives related to these areas should continue without interruption.”
The DNFSB has long had concerns about aging facilities at Y-12, and Winokur emphasized the importance of maintaining safe operations at the site’s 9212 complex and Building 9215 as well as the Beta-2E facility, for which replacement efforts have recently been delayed. “These delays will require continued efforts to mature and implement a robust aging management program for the indefinite future. Clearly, as the facilities approach end-of-life, important decisions will need to be made about the feasibility of continued safe operations,” Winokur wrote.
UPF Identified Among ‘Focus Areas’
At Y-12, Winokur also identified conduct of operations, work planning and control, Contractor Assurance Systems, training, emergency preparedness and response, as well as the Uranium Processing Facility, as “focus areas.” Winokur noted that the NNSA was likely to pursue a new strategy for UPF, but said efforts to incorporate safety into the design of the previous facility should be transferred to any new design work. “Many improvements made to integrate safety into the full-scope UPF design will apply when designing whatever alternative is pursued, and should be carried forward,” Winokur wrote.
Pantex officials have focused on improving the safety culture at the plant in recent years, and Winokur suggested that efforts to improve the safety culture at the plant should continue under a new contractor. “A strong, positive safety culture is necessary to ensure the safety of ongoing operations of defense nuclear facilities at Pantex,” he wrote. He also identified conduct of operations, fire protection systems, documented safety analysis, falling man and safety-class tooling analysis, and emergency preparedness and response as focus areas for Pantex.
