Alissa Tabirian
NS&D Monitor
9/4/2015
A truck carrying coveralls that contained samples of highly enriched uranium (HEU) was flagged last year upon trying to exit the Protected Area of the Y-12 National Security Complex, the Department of Energy (DOE) Inspector General’s Office (IG) revealed in a report released today.
The IG said it received a claim of mismanagement of special nuclear material (SNM) at the lab involving the Jan. 22, 2014 discovery of HEU samples “in the pocket of coveralls located on a laundry truck that annunciated an alarm as the truck tried to exit Y-12’s Protected Area.” The IG “substantiated the allegations” and noted that Y-12 “conducted 2 internal investigations concerning the incident and generally implemented corrective actions to address most of the issues outlined in the allegations.” The IG did not offer details on where the HEU had originated or the circumstances under which it was left in the coveralls, but noted that it confirmed “chemical operators are no longer allowed to place samples in their pockets and must check their pockets before removing their coveralls.”
The security of sensitive materials at Y-12 was most notably called into question in 2012 when three anti-nuclear activists broke into the site and vandalized property.
The Sept. 1 IG report notes that a Y-12 subject matter expert determined “the threat of a nuclear criticality accident occurring during the incident was very low” because “the minimum critical mass for a nuclear criticality accident is over 700 grams,” while the samples discovered in this incident “contained only 20 grams of uranium.”
The IG found, however, that Y-12 had not yet completed corrective actions regarding “a safety violation that occurred during the discovery of the HEU samples” – specifically, failing to follow Y-12 procedure to “establish at least a 15 foot boundary around the [HEU] samples.” Site personnel also delayed notifying the Plant Shift Superintendent Office (PSS) “about the discovery of the HEU samples until approximately 8 hours after the incident,” the report says. This represented another breach of site procedure. Facility management told the IG it would address both issues, the report says.
The IG noted that Y-12 has “taken action to improve the tracking and handling of HEU.” This includes the “inclusion of SNM samples in their bar code tracking system,” from which special nuclear materials were previously exempted “due to their low weight.” Y-12 has revised internal procedures and “communicated to all personnel how to respond to fissile material that is present in an unapproved location,” the report says. It notes that because it has observed progress and improvement, “we are not making recommendations or suggestions.” Y-12’s managing contractor Consolidated Nuclear Security did not provide comment in response to the report by press time.
