The material is believed to have been inaccurately marked as classified information, and Simonson said the incident “resulted from failure to evaluate work control processes and operational conditions for work activities in a classified subject area.” A separate Office of Enforcement review of a security incident that involved differences in the inventory of classified accountable nuclear material revealed that inventory practices and documentation were “inconsistent and inaccurate” for several years. “Poor accounting and housekeeping practices caused significant difficulty in reconciling inventory discrepancies and determining the final disposition of a number of accountable items,” Simonson said, noting that the issues had been addressed. CNS spokesman Jason Bohne said the company is taking the Office of Enforcement recommendations seriously. “We have already acted on several of them, and will continue implementing longer-term measures as well,” Bohne said.
A June 2014 incident at the Y-12 National Security Complex that left classified material potentially exposed was due to “poor work control processes that had existed for over a decade,” the Department of Energy’s Office of Enforcement said last month in a letter to current Y-12 contractor Consolidated Nuclear Security. DOE chose not to levy any fines against CNS, which took over the combined Y-12/Pantex management and operating contract several weeks after the incident took place, but Office of Enforcement Director Steven Simonson highlighted a variety of concerns in a Feb. 13 letter to CNS.
CNS said in September that no classified information was endangered during the incident and called the event “a case of classified documents being discovered in an unapproved location by a Y-12 employee.” An initial review of the incident by previous Y-12 contractor B&W Y-12 suggested it was an isolated event timed to housekeeping activities in advance of a visit by an important official and “general unease” among employees about the impending contract transition, according to Office of Enforcement Director Steven Simonson, but he said that review “inappropriately determined that this event resulted in no loss, compromise, or potential compromise of classified information.”
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