The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty needs to be fixed, and a senior nuclear nonproliferation expert laid out a five-part plan for strengthening the landmark treaty that includes consequences for countries that withdraw from the pact, more invasive inspections and nuclear reductions for all countries: not just the U.S. and Russia. And failing improvement, former Nuclear Regulatory Commission commissioner Victor Gilinsky suggested that the advance of nuclear power should not trump international security. “Lacking adequate protection … I would say it does not make sense for us to be pushing for expanding nuclear power worldwide if we don’t have this level of protection,” said Gilinsky, whose recommendations form the backbone of a draft report by the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center released yesterday. Gilinsky outlined his views during a discussion on Capitol Hill yesterday with Jamie Fly of the Foreign Policy Initiative, George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and NPEC Executive Director Henry Sokolski.
Key to strengthening the NPT, Gilinsky said, was instituting penalties for treaty violators and institutionalizing penalties. “There needs to be a regular, agreed upon response at least to the possibility that a country announces withdrawal,” he said. “Otherwise these things are up for grabs and up to the various political calculations of the moment.” He also said that it was necessary to establish a technical safety hedge, widening the gap between a country’s right to pursue nuclear energy and the relatively small jump to using that technology for military use, as well as greater inspection powers for the International Atomic Energy Agency. Requiring nuclear weapons reductions for all nuclear weapons states, both those declared under the NPT and countries like India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel, is also necessary to achieve significant progress on reductions, Gilinsky said. Gilinsky, however, noted that his plan was a “tough sell,” but he said it was important to lay out the agenda in order to impact nonproliferation policy-making in the U.S. and abroad.
