Karl Herchenroeder
RW Monitor
11/20/2015
An independent nuclear energy expert on Tuesday questioned the progress of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi crisis, saying he doesn’t feel the American public is adequately prepared for a severe nuclear event, despite the NRC’s re-evaluation of safeguards and mitigation resources in place for U.S. reactors.
During an NRC hearing on the issue, David Lochbaum, director of the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Nuclear Safety Project, said his most significant concern is how the NRC is addressing hydrogen and mitigation control at the reactors. The Fukushima nuclear power plant experienced several hydrogen detonations in the meltdown that followed the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami. The NRC’s most recent orders related to lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi crisis address boiling water reactor sites but not ice-condenser plants, which are equivalent in size and vulnerability, Lochbaum said, suggesting the agency doesn’t have a full grasp of the issue.
Jack Davis, director of NRC’s Japan Lessons Learned Division, said the agency’s three-tiered strategy for lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi crisis is in line with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s August 2015 report on the incident. That report analyzes the causes and consequences of the Japanese event, and offers safety recommendations for international government, regulators, and nuclear power plant operators. Approaches may differ, he said, but the outcomes are equivalent, expressing confidence that America’s reactors are safer today than they were in 2011. As an example, NRC Region I Administrator Bill Dean cited the agency’s “walkdowns,” or detailed inspections, for seismic and flooding protection features at nuclear plants. For instance he said the industry has learned from walkdowns at Florida’s St. Lucie facility, where the NRC increased oversight due to operation violations in 2014, and Arkansas Nuclear One, where officials are preparing a comprehensive inspection as a result of performance issues.
“I think that the system worked in terms of inspections, and we share the information, and it emanated out of the ANO and St. Lucie events so the industry could learn from the failures of some of their peers,” Dean said. “We obviously have more work to do that’ll come out of the flooding hazard evaluations, but I think the walkdowns were successful given what their intent was.”
Victor McCree, NRC’s executive director for operations, made similar statements, noting that facilities are complying with NRC’s Tier 1 orders, which are intended to improve safety at U.S. reactors. The re-evaluation of hazards will continue alongside site safety improvements as the NRC proceeds with Tiers 2 and 3 of the safety initiative. The NRC is projected to complete the program in 2019.
Lochbaum voiced a number of other concerns during the hearing at NRC headquarters in Rockville, Md. He took issue with standards for “flex” equipment, which are the vehicles and equipment required for emergency response to severe disasters. The up-front training for staff is available, Lochbaum said, but there is no practice to determine the learning curve for when staff actually needs to perform in the event of a disaster.
“So we’re going to break off the shrink wrap in case of some severe accident and hope that works,” Lochbaum said. “I hope so also, but I don’t have that assurance.”
NRC Commissioner William Ostendorff said he appreciated the comment but disagreed, saying that just last week he visited an Exelon site and witnessed the improvements for himself. He specifically cited a series of ramps designed for vehicles so they don’t impact any hoses that would be needed in the event of a fire. He then asked Lochbaum what specific examples he had of the flex equipment not meeting his expectations.
Lochbaum pointed to the Pilgrim nuclear plant in Massachusetts, where he said flex equipment is stored in two buildings and looks like it “was bought at Sears.” They’re 2,300 feet apart and built “with the hope that whatever bad disaster causes you to use it doesn’t wipe out both those buildings and scatter all that equipment in the ocean,” Lochbaum said.
“We feel there are a lot of things being dismissed cavalierly, without full consideration of the factors,” Lochbaum said. “We’re disappointed in the efforts that have been taken.”
Ostendorff said he believes Tier 1 significantly improves nuclear safety and expressed confidence the second and third tiers will be just as effective. “We may have to agree to disagree, but I appreciate you being here at the table,” he said.
Tier 1 is intended to improve mitigation for prolonged losses of power, analysis and response to flooding and seismic activity, staffing needs and communication capability, and confinement and filtering of radioactive material in the event of reactor core damage, among other improvements.
Tier 2 is directed at spent fuel replacement, emergency preparedness, and external events beside flooding and seismic activity, among other areas. The list for Tier 3 improvements includes periodic confirmation of external hazards; fire prevention and mitigation; hydrogen control; emergency preparedness beyond tiers 1 and 2; radiation monitoring; public education; expedited transfer of spent fuel to dry cask storage; and reactor and containment designs that can withstand sever disasters.