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Todd Jacobson
NS&D Monitor
7/3/2014
Efforts by the National Nuclear Security Administration to revamp its security program in the wake of the July 2012 security breach at the Y-12 National Security Complex have lacked a “clear vision” or roadmap, the Government Accountability Office said in a report released this week. The report details a host of changes at the agency after the security breach, but notes that the NNSA ignored the recommendations of a Security Task Force formed after the incident to develop and implement a security roadmap to help strengthen security policy across the weapons complex.
The lack of a coordinated effort, the GAO said, “may have exacerbated a difficult period for NNSA’s security program since the Y-12 breach.” The GAO added: “Without developing a clear vision and path forward for its security program, NNSA risks putting in place another short-lived or ineffective response to its security problems.” The GAO report was requested by the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
Multiple Reform Efforts Create Confusion
The July 2012 incident, in which an elderly nun and two other elderly peace activists reached the most secure portion of Y-12 and were able to vandalize and splash human blood on the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, rocked the NNSA to its core. In the wake of the incident, the NNSA transferred key security officials to other jobs, removed security contractor G4S Government Solutions and revamped security policies across the weapons complex to streamline lines of accountability.
But without a roadmap governing its moves, many of the changes were introduced and then reversed, including a decision to initiate a security inspection program out of the Office of Defense Nuclear Security in the wake of the security breach, according to the GAO. That program was later discontinued during a revamp of the agency’s security organization, as was a decision to split the authority for security between the office of Defense Nuclear Security and a headquarters-based security organization.
Reform Goals ‘Less Clearly Defined and Less Focused’ Than Previous Attempts
The second reorganization under acting NNSA Administrator Bruce Held was designed to better clarify lines of authority and accountability by reducing the number of headquarters organizations in charge of security, allowing the Office of Defense Nuclear Security to focus on its role implementing policy across the complex. “While the current reorganization effort may eventually lead to improvements in NNSA’s security performance and oversight, the goals for security appear to be less clearly defined and less focused than previous attempts at security reform,” the GAO said.
The GAO also said that as of March of this year, NNSA sites were in “varying stages” of reintroducing DOE directives into their contracts, bringing the directives back after the NNSA had moved to develop its own security requirements before the security breach. Officials in DOE’s Office of Health, Safety and Security also stopped an effort to revise the Department’s threat posture, which the GAO said would have allowed NNSA sites to reduce security costs, but a new threat policy that incorporated the lessons learned from the Y-12 security breach had not been issued as of earlier this year.
Reaction to Changes Mixed
Reaction to the numerous changes has been mixed, according to the GAO, which quoted some NNSA officials calling the period after the security breach “chaotic” or “dysfunctional” with top officials being replaced and numerous officials assuming acting roles. Some officials told the GAO that communication and direction from headquarters had been “far less frequent” after the security breach, while others said the leadership changes had been “disruptive” and sapped morale. “Some of these same NNSA officials also said that NNSA has been without an effective headquarters security organization since the Y-12 breach and were skeptical that NNSA had found an effective organizational structure, even with the latest changes,” the GAO said. “Others, however, said that these changes may provide a better organizational structure with clearer lines of authority and accountability.”
Klotz Promises to Develop ‘Security Roadmap’
In response to the GAO report, new NNSA Administrator Frank Klotz said the agency was planning to develop by the end of the year a “security roadmap” that will “clearly delineate the NNSA security vision and the path forward for the security program.”
In a joint statement, House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton (R-Mich.) and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee Chairman Tim Murphy (R-Pa.) said they would continue to closely watch DOE and NNSA security reforms “to make sure any security improvements can be sustained.”
