Todd Jacobson
NS&D Monitor
11/21/2014
The United States should take another look at its policy of excluding low-enriched uranium from foreign-owned companies from its tritium production efforts, the Government Accountability Office said in a report released late last week. In a report requested by Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) and Rep. Michael Burgess (R-Texas), the GAO noted that conditions have changed drastically since the United States determined in 1998 that nonproliferation concerns and international agreements prohibit it from using so-called “encumbered” LEU for the production of tritium, which is used in nuclear weapons.
Most notably, with the shutdown of USEC enrichment operations in 2013 and the uncertain future of the American Centrifuge Project, the United States currently has no way to produce “unencumbered” LEU for tritium production. And DOE currently only has enough “unencumbered” LEU to last through 2030, or even less depending on tritium production rates, the GAO noted.
An Issue for Four Foreign-Owned Enrichment Plants
Currently, four foreign-owned enrichment plants planned for the United States or already operating on U.S. soil are barred from producing LEU for tritium production. That includes URENCO, which has questioned U.S. policy and argued that it is not prohibited from producing LEU for tritium production because tritium is a “byproduct” material of burning nuclear fuel. URENCO owns Louisiana Energy Services and its Eunice, N.M. enrichment plant, which is the owner of the only operating enrichment plant in the country.
Tritium for use in the NNSA’s weapons program is produced by burning unencumbered LEU at the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Watts Bar nuclear plant. The gas, which is used to boost the yield of a nuclear explosion, is captured when the LEU is irradiated and sent to the Savannah River Site, where it is processed. In recent years, however, higher-than-expected permeation of tritium curbed the amount of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods at Watts Bar. If it becomes necessary to use more than one Watts Bar reactor to produce tritium, the nation’s supply of LEU could be more quickly depleted, the GAO said.
‘New Importance’ for U.S. to Review Position on LEU for Tritium Production
The situation gives “new importance to the need for the executive branch to review its position on how the United States will obtain LEU for tritium production,” the GAO said. Currently, the Department of Energy, Department of State and other agencies are examining how to obtain unobligated LEU for tritium production in the future. “By taking steps to coordinate the interagency community to review DOE’s current practice of using unobligated LEU for tritium production, decision makers may have greater assurance that decisions on how to obtain future LEU for tritium production are based on a coordinated understanding of U.S. obligations consistent with international agreements and U.S. nonproliferation goals,” the GAO said.
The GAO said the issue is ripe for review because the nation’s previously plentiful supply of LEU is dwindling with USEC ceasing enrichment operations and the American Centrifuge Project’s future up in the air. “This change has led some parties to question whether a change in DOE’s practice could result in the United States obtaining LEU for national security purposes from other enrichment facilities, such as URENCO, and avoid the potentially significant expense of paying the costs to operate the ACP,” the GAO said.
The GAO said it recommended that the review produce either an “affirmation of DOE’s continuing practice or a commitment to study alternative sources of LEU consistent with international agreements and U.S. nonproliferation goals.”
GAO: Two of Three Agreements Don’t Explicitly Prohibit LEU for Tritium
The GAO noted in its review that two of the three agreements impacting foreign-owned enrichment companies in the United States do not explicitly prohibit using LEU for tritium production: the Washington Agreement and the Paris Agreement, which affect the URENCO facility and AREVA’s planned Eagle Rock (Idaho) facility. Only the SILEX 123 agreement, which affects the Global Laser Enrichment facility planned for North Carolina, specifically addresses byproduct material like tritium. “However, DOE interprets and applies these agreements through the lens of U.S. nonproliferation goals, and thus it has consistently used only unobligated LEU for tritium production,” the GAO said.
Nonproliferation Concerns an Issue
The Administration can establish nonproliferation policy however it sees fit, the GAO noted, which could trump concerns about the dwindling supply of LEO. “State officials stated that their reading of the agreements is supported by the text of those agreements and consistent with U.S. nonproliferation policy interests … and is also reflected in nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries,” the GAO said. “Officials told us that they believe that U.S. practice is in keeping with that of other countries on this point and that the best way to ensure that U.S. policy is upheld with respect to our requirements on other countries is to interpret our obligations to other countries in a similar manner.”
In a response to the report, the National Nuclear Security Administration did not say it agreed or disagreed with GAO’s findings or recommendations, but NNSA Administrator Frank Klotz said the GAO’s work “highlights the inherent challenges of ensuring an adequate and sustainable supply of LEU for future tritium production, while continuing to pursue non-proliferation policy goals.” Klotz added, “The Department will continue to pursue effective strategies for addressing these challenges by leveraging the cooperation of our interagency partners to evaluate viable supply options, including a collaborative review of current policies and practices.”
