The Los Alamos National Laboratory’s nuclear criticality safety program in fiscal 2016 fell short of DOE requirements, but a program improvement plan has been established, according to an annual nuclear criticality safety program metrics report submitted to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB).
The DNFSB asked DOE in February 2016 to provide a yearly nuclear criticality safety criteria metrics table, including information about each site including the number of criticality safety infractions, the number of noncompliances with DOE criticality safety standards, the number of contractor and federal criticality safety assessments completed, current contractor and federal criticality safety staffing levels, and the department’s evaluation of overall contractor performance in this area.
The report covers facilities overseen by DOE’s semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration and the Offices of Science and Environmental Management. Of those, only Los Alamos earned a “red” grade — for “does not meet expectations” — in the table on criticality safety infractions and program noncompliances.
The table identified a set of criticality safety infractions – 17 were Level 5, six were Level 4, and one was Level 3. DOE sites usually consider Level 4 and 5 infractions the least severe, while Level 3 is generally for situations with one barrier to criticality, Level 2 a near miss, and Level 1 an accident. A criticality accident would involve an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction resulting in radiation release.
Los Alamos also had 21 contractor-identified and three externally identified program instances of noncompliance, the report said. It noted that the site’s criticality program “remains noncompliant in several areas and compensatory measures remain in place to ensure safety in operations,” and that the overall rating would be “adequate but needs improvement” if the program were compared against program improvement goals rather than against program requirements.
“A program improvement plan is in place and progress is closely monitored by the Field Office,” the table said about the lab.
The report noted there were three contractor assessments and three federal assessments of the Los Alamos criticality safety program in fiscal 2016 – the first yielded three findings, or observations requiring a corrective action plan, and the second yielded four.
Los Alamos had nine qualified contractor staff members to perform criticality safety work, which was not enough to meet the programmatic need, according to the table. The lab had one qualified federal staff member for the same purpose, which was also not enough to meet the need, it said.
