The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday said an initial staff review of renewing a 30-year-old civil nuclear agreement with China “landed on the positive side,” but lawmakers also raised numerous concerns about the deal. Committee Republicans and Democrats expressed concerns about possible Chinese intentions including providing nuclear technology to other countries and using uranium enrichment to gain a military advantage. Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.) cited Chinese violations of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) export rules by working on Pakistani nuclear reactors. Tom Countryman, State Department Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, testified in response that the ongoing civil agreement prohibits the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology to any other nation without U.S. consent. “There’s, I think, a difference between violating NSG rules…and violating a 123 agreement, particularly when this agreement, unlike the agreement it replaces, has specific laws that call for temporary suspension or permanent suspension in case of violation,” he said. Menendez called for a clearer definition of U.S. nonproliferation objectives. “I was always an admirer that U.S. policy was about actually stopping nuclear proliferation, not managing it,” he said.
On April 20, the Obama Administration submitted the nuclear cooperation bill to Congress for approval. During the hearing, Committee Chair Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) cited the Nonproliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) accompanying the agreement that stated Chinese State Owned Enterprises transferred proliferation-sensitive dual-use materials and technologies, which drew U.S. sanctions. Countryman said China’s nonproliferation record was improving, but "could be better." In prepared remarks, he stated that the renewal could allow the U.S. to influence the Chinese government’s approach to nonproliferation. “We strongly believe that implementing this agreement will better position the United States to influence the Chinese Government to act in a manner that advances our global nuclear nonproliferation objectives,” he told the committee. “Conversely, failing to do so would set us back immeasurably in terms of access and influence on issues of nonproliferation and nuclear cooperation. The current China 123 agreement has allowed for, and the agreement will continue to facilitate, deepened cooperation with China on nonproliferation, threat reduction, export control, and border security.”