Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor Vol. 21 No. 7
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Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor
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February 17, 2017

Trump Administration Crafting Nuclear Policy Amid Uncertainty Over Arms Control – Day 25 of 100

By Alissa Tabirian
Donald Trump President-elect portrait

Editor’s note: This is the second in a series of quarterly news summaries and analyses about President Donald Trump’s first 100 days in office. We’ll check in with one long, big-picture update every 25 days, with a regular flow of updates in between to keep you up on news affecting the U.S. nuclear deterrent during the new administration’s crucial first days.

President Donald Trump has been in office for nearly one month today, during which time he has ordered the crafting of a new nuclear policy as he continues to shape his Cabinet – a process that has been complicated by uncertainty surrounding the United States’ effort to engage Russia on arms control.

Among Trump’s responsibilities is oversight of the U.S. nuclear arsenal through the Department of Energy and its semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration, with its $12.9 billion annual budget for work that includes maintaining the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile. One-quarter of the way through the administration’s first 100 days in office, the NNSA remains led by a holdover from the Obama administration and a number of senior positions remain vacant.

Other key posts across multiple agencies also have yet to be filled: for example, the State Department’s top arms control official. Meanwhile, national security adviser Michael Flynn has already come and gone, and his reported replacement declined to take the job.

High-level policy changes will largely depend on officials in positions that have yet to be filled – this would include implementing programs in accordance with the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review, settling on a policy for the MOX facility, proposing and defending the DOE and NNSA budgets, and engaging Russia on arms control issues.

Here is a glimpse of where things stand in the areas of nuclear security and arms control today as the Trump administration tries to settle in:

PERSONNEL

Trump’s nominees for secretary of state and secretary of defense, former ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson and retired Marine Corps. Gen. James Mattis, respectively, both received Senate confirmation – Mattis in late January and Tillerson earlier this month. Meanwhile, Trump’s pick for secretary of energy, former Texas governor Rick Perry, has yet to receive a Senate vote; that could be a week or more away.

Frank Klotz remains in his role as NNSA chief while the administration considers other candidates; the retired Air Force general was asked to stay on temporarily just before Trump’s inauguration. Candidates rumored to be under consideration for the job include Paul Longsworth, a Fluor executive and former NNSA deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation, and Jay Cohen, a retired Navy admiral who served in the Department of Homeland Security.

At the State Department, Thomas Countryman departed late last month from his position as acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, a role that has not yet been filled. The position oversees the State Department’s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance; the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; and the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

We’re watching for: Perry’s confirmation vote in the Senate; Klotz’s replacement as NNSA administrator; a new undersecretary of state for arms control and international security.

POLICY

Trump on Jan. 27 signed a national security memorandum that requires the development of a new Nuclear Posture Review “to ensure that the United States nuclear deterrent is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready, and appropriately tailored to deter 21st-century threats and reassure our allies.”

The NPR establishes U.S. nuclear policy for up to a decade; the last version was produced in 2010 under former President Barack Obama, who set as policy goals the prevention of nuclear terrorism and the reduction of the number and role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy.

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein said last week the Defense Department should complete the NPR this spring, and indicated that new options for the development and use of lower-yield nuclear warheads might be considered. So far, arms control experts have said the NPR is more likely to focus on modernization of the nuclear triad, which is expected to continue largely unchanged; Trump’s Cabinet picks have indicated the administration would continue the current U.S. nuclear modernization program, which would involve an investment of $1 trillion over 30 years to upgrade each leg of the nuclear triad.

Last month, the Trump administration was rumored to be planning a series of federal funding cuts that would cut 10 percent of the DOE budget and redirect that funding into NNSA’s defense programs, including stockpile refurbishment and supporting infrastructure. Moreover, funding within the NNSA could also be reshuffled; its nonproliferation and disarmament programs may receive less, in favor of greater investment in the weapons program. No such action has been taken yet, however.

Another looming issue involves the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility under construction at the Savannah River Site in Aiken. S.C. The Obama administration tried to shut down the project in favor of an alternative method to dilute and dispose of 34 metric tons of surplus weapon-usable plutonium, a proposal that has met some resistance in Congress.

The Trump administration will need to decide whether to continue construction of the facility or switch to the other method. According to one source, a senior Obama appointee at the NNSA is encouraging the new administration to shut down the project.

The Trump administration was also rumored to be last month considering two executive orders that would limit or cut U.S. funding to international organizations under certain conditions. The White House has not released these executive orders, so the potential impact on U.S. contributions to organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization remains unclear.

We’re watching for: A declaration of Trump’s nuclear policy through the Nuclear Posture Review.

ARMS CONTROL

Recent media reports cited several sources who claimed Trump dismissed the New START accord during a Jan. 28 phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, calling it one of the unfair U.S.-Russian agreements signed during the Obama administration. Trump also initially appeared unfamiliar with the treaty, sources told Reuters, a claim the administration dismissed.

The two countries are currently in good standing under the agreement, which requires by February 2018 that each side cap its nuclear arsenal at 700 deployed ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers; 1,550 fielded strategic warheads; and 800 deployed and nondeployed long-range launchers. The treaty expires in 2021, leaving the new administration to decide whether to negotiate a follow-on, extend the existing treaty limits for an additional five years, or abandon bilateral arms control entirely.

If true, the media reports might indicate an unwillingness by the new administration to negotiate a follow-on treaty. However, Tillerson expressed support during his nomination hearing last month for bipartisan arms control engagement with Russia. Even so, there has not yet been any discussion on extending New START; the administration is conducting a broad review of its arms control policies.

Yet another complicating factor involves the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which remains a sticking point for U.S.-Russian relations since the U.S. State Department under Obama concluded that Russia violated the agreement by flight testing an intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile. The treaty prohibits the two countries from fielding surface-to-surface ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

The New York Times this week cited administration officials as saying that Russia has now deployed a ground-launched cruise missile – reportedly the same kind it tested in 2014 – and therefore remains in violation of the treaty. The report said Russia has deployed two battalions with the cruise missile, and that the Pentagon could respond either through additional missile defense deployments in Europe or its own development of air- or sea-based cruise missiles.

Acting State Department spokesman Mark Toner said in an emailed statement that although the department does not comment on intelligence matters, “The United States takes seriously its international commitments and arms control obligations.”

“We have made very clear our concerns about Russia’s violation, the risks it poses to European and Asian security, and our strong interest in Russia returning to compliance with the Treaty,” Toner said. “The Administration is undertaking an extensive review of Russia’s ongoing INF Treaty violation in order to assess the potential security implications for the United States and its allies and partners.”

Nuclear nonproliferation expert Jeffrey Lewis said in a series of tweets this week that he believes the cruise missile in question is the 9M729 for the Iskander-M, or a land-deployed version of the sea-based Kalibr cruise missile with a range of 2,500 kilometers.

The event brought about a swift reaction from legislators. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) said in a statement that the violation is Russia’s “testing of the new administration.” Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) said Tuesday that Trump should call an emergency meeting of the treaty’s Special Verification Commission, while Republican lawmakers in both chambers of Congress on Thursday introduced legislation aimed at persuading Russia to return to compliance with the INF. The White House has not yet commented on the issue.

Linton Brooks, former NNSA administrator, said recently in an interview with NS&D Monitor that further U.S.-Russian arms control agreements are virtually impossible without first addressing the INF violation. “It is inconceivable to me that the United States would negotiate a new arms control regime while that violation is not addressed in some manner,” he said. “And it’s even more inconceivable that a treaty that was negotiated without dealing with that violation could be ratified by this or any other Senate.”

We’re watching for: Deliberations on INF Treaty compliance and the future of New START.

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