Staff Reports
NS&D Monitor
2/5/2016
The National Nuclear Security Administration this week finally spelled out some of the details of a 2014 “security event” involving the mishandling of classified information at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant in Oak Ridge, Tenn. Most of the blame went to former site contractor B&W Y-12, but the NNSA waived the proposed fines – which had been calculated at $240,000 for three violations, one of which was particularly severe – because the company had taken quick steps to address the situation and, especially, because B&W Y-12 had already been penalized by a reduction in its award fee for fiscal 2014.
The preliminary notice of violation was released publicly this week, a few days after B&W Y-12 was informed of the findings of the investigation by the Department of Energy’s Office of Enterprise Assessments.
The event occurred in June 2014, when a Y-12 contractor worker identified what was characterized as a “work-related paper” – with markings for “Secret/Restricted Data” – in an unclassified waste bag bound for disposal. The bag had already been shuffled out of the “material access area,” which is the plant’s high-security production zone, and was on its way toward disposal at an off-site burial site.
According to the notice of violations, the bag contained about 19 additional papers that were either marked as classified or appeared to contain classified information.
Subsequent checks found that other waste containers that were supposed to be limited to unclassified materials housed classified documents as well.
“B&W Y-12 then decided not to search any additional containers because they were, given the prior results, presumed likely to contain additional classified information and further searches would have added to the cost and potential safety concerns associated with low-level waste,” the federal report said.
The notice indicated that one of the three violations of classified security requirements reached Severity Level I. That means there was “actual or high potential for adverse impact on the national security.” Two other violations were characterized as Level II, which meant the situation represented a “lack of attention or carelessness” in protection of classified information. That laxity could impact national security if not corrected, the report said.
The DOE investigation at the Oak Ridge site, which included interviews with plant workers, suggested the problem with inappropriate disposal of classified information may have existed for years. The newly released DOE report also noted that the supposed-to-be unclassified containers were sent off-site for disposal, but the exact location of the off-site burial facility was not spelled out in the report.
Consolidated Nuclear Security succeeded B&W Y-12 as the government’s managing contractor at Y-12 in July 2014, and when the security event became publicly known shortly thereafter CNS emphasized that an internal investigation at the site had found that no classified information was breached or “compromised” by the events.
A February 2015 report basically cleared CNS of any direct involvement, noting that the issues of concern occurred before the company took over management of Y-12. However, Bechtel – which heads the current CNS team at Y-12 – also was a partner in the previous contractor management team of B&W Y-12.
Jud Simmons, a spokesman for BWXT, said in a statement the company would not contest the violations in the notice. “As BWXT noted during the enforcement conference, our notification of this 2014 incident to the NNSA was timely and accurate, and there was no compromise of classified information. While still serving as the contractor at Y-12, we implemented an effective corrective action plan that was accepted by the customer. We believe that the NNSA’s decision to not impose a civil penalty is appropriate, and we do not intend to further contest the NNSA’s conclusions.”
