Staff Reports
NS&D Monitor
9/12/2014
The National Nuclear Security Administration has ordered new Y-12 contractor Consolidated Nuclear Security to dig deeper into a series of abnormal events over the past couple of years, assess whether there are any systemic issues that have been missed or undocumented and come up with a path forward that will get things operating as they should in the future.
NNSA Production Office Manager Steve Erhart established the mandate in an Aug. 11 letter to Bechtel-led Consolidated Nuclear Security, which took over management of Y-12 and the Pantex facilities on July 1. He gave CNS President and CEO Jim Haynes 60 days to do a comprehensive assessment of Y-12 operations, come up with fixes and evaluate how the Y-12 issues can be put to use in the management of Pantex as well as the Oak Ridge plant. The report will be due around Oct. 10.
Letter Decries ‘Cultural Undercurrent of Complacency’
Erhart’s letter identified a number of security and safety events that had not previously been disclosed publicly. The NPO manager acknowledged that some of the incidents occurred before CNS took over responsibility for management of Y-12 and Pantex on July 1. “However,” he wrote, “it is now our collective responsibility to assure that both Plants safely and securely execute mission deliverables/requirements while meeting our customers’ expectations and desires.” He added: “Since the July 2013 accidental weapon discharge, a series of abnormal events have occurred at Y-12 that indicate a cultural undercurrent of complacency with regards to disciplined operations.”
Erhart said he wanted CNS to take a broader look than previous studies, not just focusing on the problems listed in the letter, but including an evaluation of plant performance that goes beyond the “typical statistics,” rates, and metrics.
Incidents Detailed
Among the security issues raised in Erhart letter was a June 9 incident in which a bag containing an enriched uranium metal plate was found in an unauthorized storage area at Y-12. Less than a month later, two pellets of highly enriched uranium were found misplaced in an area of the 9212 complex, the uranium production hub for the Oak Ridge plant.
On July 21, production workers identified classified parts that were being prepared for disposal as unclassified waste. In another, separate incident that month, classified and unclassified wastes were co-mingled at the site, and investigations determined that it was not an isolated incident. The result was a temporary suspension of all off-site waste shipments.
One of the more recent security issues was evidence that a tamper-indicating seal on a secured door was broken during a protective force exercise at the plant. The incident ultimately revealed other issues as well. Erhart also cited a violation of the “two-person rule”—which requires that at least two authorized employees be present during critical operations or access to special nuclear materials. Other events included failure to secure an area and closing a security portal without setting the alarm system; an unauthorized personal weapon inside the high-security Protected Area at Y-12 and an “inventory discrepancy.”
Questions Remain on Inventory Discrepancy
The NNSA and CNS declined to answer questions about the letter or some of the issues raised in it. Steven Wyatt, a spokesman in the NNSA Production Office, would not confirm if the discrepancy occurred within inventory of highly enriched uranium. Y-12 is the nation’s principal repository for HEU, reportedly with hundreds of tons of the weapons-making material in storage—although the exact amount if classified.
When CNS was preparing to take over management of Y-12, the contractor team took a complete inventory of virtually all of the government-owned properties it would take responsibility for, effective 1. However, in an April interview, CNS President Haynes confirmed that the incoming contractor did not do a complete inventory of HEU because B&W Y-12, the prior contractor, had recently done one. Haynes indicated that CNS would do spot checks of the HEU in storage and said he was confident in the process.
Erhart Says Contractor Has ‘Unprecedented Opportunity’ for Improvement
Meanwhile, in his Aug. 11 letter, Erhart also outlined some safety problems at Y-12 that had caused concern in the federal camp. He mentioned a problem earlier this summer with the casting of enriched uranium alloys, which ultimately led to a temporary shutdown of operations. He also noted a glove fire in the E-Wing of the 9212 complex and a hydrogen fluoride leak, among other issues. “These abnormal events can be attributed to ineffective discipline of operations, poor housekeeping, inadequate work procedures, failure to adhere to procedures, worker complacency, inadequate communications, etc,” Erhart wrote, adding: “The frequency and severity of events demonstrate a failure to integrate the full spectrum of functional requirements, such as safeguards and security, conduct of operations, fire protection and nuclear and worker safety into day-to-day work activities.”
Erhart told Haynes that the Y-12/Pantex contractor should view the situation as an “unprecedented opportunity” to have a positive influence on the culture at the two national security facilities.
In Employee Message, CNS Says No Classified Info Compromised in June Incident
CNS would not respond to requests for comment or information, but sent a statement to Y-12 employees regarding recent news reports of problems at the plant—including an earlier announcement that the Department of Energy’s Office of Enforcement planned to investigate a potential breach of classified information at the national security facility. The enforcement team plans to come to Y-12 Oct. 6-9 to do an on-site investigation.
In a message to employees signed by Haynes and Bill Tindal, the contractor’s Y-12 site manager, the leadership said an internal investigation by CNS found that no classified information had been compromised by the June incident. They said the situation was “a case of classified documents being discovered in an unapproved location by a Y-12 employee.” They added: “We have implemented a new policy—which many of you are familiar with—to prevent recurrence. We will fully support further investigation and surveillance of the effectiveness of our new policy, consistent with our fundamental security absolute that requires each of us to be vigilant and engaged on a daily basis in ensuring security in all aspects of our operations.” CNS did respond to questions about the new policy to protect classified information.
CNS: Wrong Perception Given on Y-12
In regards to news reports on the letter to Erhart to Haynes, the CNS leadership said, “The direction contained in the letter is forthright and fair. We will perform and deliver a high quality evaluation, and we’ll need help from all of you.”
The CNS executives also told employees that news reports had given the wrong perception of the operations at Y-12. “We know that Y-12 is really a collection of thousands of dedicated employees, working hard every day to deliver our national security mission with safety, security, quality, and cost efficiency,” Haynes and Tindal wrote. “Our operational performance—particularly within the context of the gravity of our mission, the rigor of our work processes, and the condition of many of our facilities—remains exemplary. Any perception that we are anything less is uncomfortable, and frankly, is a disservice to the work that we do.”
