DNFSB Member Stresses ‘Leadership’ in Ensuring Strong Safety Culture

By Mike Nartker

Board Hears from Experts on How To Assess and Address Culture Issues

Mike Nartker
WC Monitor
5/30/2014

As the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board begins gearing up to take a new look at whether workers across the Department of Energy complex feel safe to raise concerns, one Board member warned this week that there is no “magic bullet” for ensuring a strong safety culture, and instead stressed the necessity of “leadership.” DNFSB Member Sean Sullivan made his remarks during a Board meeting held in Washington intended to give the Board a chance to hear from an industry expert, as well as representatives from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and NASA, on various ways to assess and address safety culture issues. Sullivan, though, appeared to be highly skeptical at the onset of the meeting. “As I understand the purpose of this hearing, we’re supposed to be gathering information that may be used in a subsequent hearing with the Department of Energy to enlighten them on ways to improve their safety culture. To be honest, I don’t believe anyone can say anything—myself included—in this room in the next few hours that could fulfill that purpose,” he said in his opening remarks.

Choosing to not ask questions during the course of the meeting, Sullivan instead used his closing remarks to emphasize his view of the importance of “leadership” in ensuring workers feel they can raise issues without fear. Noting his background in the U.S. Navy, where he served as a submarine officer, Sullivan said that while the Navy has “a very strong safety culture … we don’t have a definition of safety culture. We don’t have any action matrices or frameworks or tool kits. It comes down, in the Navy, to leadership.”

He went on to say, “There is no magic bullet. When you try to figure out how we maximize safety on a submarine, well the easy answer would be just tie the ships up to the pier. But that doesn’t get the mission done. Similarly we could maximize safety at Pantex if we simply stopped managing the stockpile, but that won’t work either.” Sullivan added, “These are difficult decisions, and the answer is not found in a tool kit. It can’t be taught in a one week course. You can’t come up with the magic bullet.”

DNFSB Recommendation Puts ‘Emphasis on Process’

The DNFSB has long been interested in the state of the safety culture across the DOE complex. The topic was the subject of a formal Recommendation issued in 2011 that warned of a “flawed” safety culture at one of the Department’s largest projects—the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant—and also called on DOE to perform reviews to see if safety culture concerns existed at other projects. Since then, a number of DOE reviews have found safety culture concerns at a variety of sites and projects, and the Department has been working to make improvements through measures such as increased training. Explaining the purpose of this week’s meeting, DNFSB Chairman Peter Winokur told WC Monitor, “Basically where we’re at is we want to re-evaluate Recommendation 2011-1. We want to make sure the implementation is proceeding smoothly, and that it’s achieving the desired results.” Winokur added, “I think DOE has taken a lot of very positive action [in response to] Recommendation 2011-1. What we want to verify is whether or not that action is going to result in significantly improved safety culture.”

When asked on the sidelines of this week’s meeting if DOE was too focused, however, on process in attempting to improve safety culture, Sullivan said, “I think the reaction to the Recommendation that the Board made inherently will put an emphasis on the process. That’s not to criticize the Recommendation. We wrote a Recommendation, then it becomes an implementation plan under the rules, so now there’s a plan. So now it becomes did we check the boxes on a plan?” He told WC Monitor, “I would say that there is danger in putting emphasis on process because then it becomes about the process.”

‘What Decisions Are Being Made … Day-to-Day?’

Sullivan stressed the need for managers to be able explain their decision-making to workers as a key element of ensuring workers at DOE sites feel they can raise concerns. “I’m not interested at all in what they’re doing for training courses, or what they’re doing for surveys or any of that. I’m more interested in, hey what decisions are being made on a day-to-day basis? If you put yourself in the shoes of a worker who is in the complex, what message do they take out of these decisions? And is the message communicated?” he told WC Monitor. “It doesn’t mean that the decision is wrong—the decision may stack up all of the factors and say yes absolutely, this is the right answer. But if it’s not communicated so that they understand someone decides to move forward with a particular production plan despite a safety objection that was raised, that may be the right answer. But if we don’t communicate why that was the right answer, then the worker will just draw their own conclusions, and the conclusion they will draw is that they don’t care about my safety.”

Does DOE Definition Send Right Message?

During the course of this week’s meeting, Winkour raised the question of what signals DOE may be sending with its definition of safety culture. “The definition of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations says safety is an overriding priority. But the Department of Energy’s definition is more balanced, is more in terms of the balance of the mission and safety.” Winokur said. “You’re trying to change the behavior of your workforce to hopefully improve your safety culture. And you’re hearing the message from up high, from management, and one message from the NRC may be safety is an overriding priority. That’s clearly stated in the definition of safety culture. And another organization, your core value … says you balance mission and safety. Is it meaningfully different to the workers to hear those two different message?”

Sonja Haber of the Human Performance Analysis Corporation said she did not think there was a significant difference in the definitions. “I don’t think so if the leadership implements the model for safety and behavior change in the appropriate way. I think what happens is that often we take that overriding priority to an extreme on either side. I think there has to be a balance to some extent.” In response to a question from DNFSB Vice Chair Jessie Roberson on how to balance “mission” and “safety,” Haber said the two are not “mutually exclusive,” adding, “You would want your mission-directed behaviors not to intervene with your safety directed behaviors. They really are not independent or mutually exclusive, and you often need some of those same behaviors, just perhaps focused in a different way.”

‘Continuous Improvement’ Should be Goal, Expert Says

Winokur also asked during the meeting what is the best way to gauge safety culture at a specific site or project, citing as an example a survey that may show 95 percent of workers feel comfortable raising concerns. “If I told you that 95 percent of the people in this room would get home safely tonight, no one would agree with that right? And we don’t permit 95 percent of the jets to make it safely to the airports they’re going to. But we would permit 95 percent to land on time. So do what these numbers really mean to us? What are we looking for in terms of establishing this culture?” Winokur said.

The goal should be “continuous improvement,” Haber said “I think the goal for me is not the number so much as the desire or the behavior to want to continue to improve.” she said. “One of the leading indicators of a safety culture that will start declining is complacency. It’s the idea that ok I’m at 95 percent, that’s as good as it gets, so I can just coast along there. It’s that attitude. It’s not getting the 100 percent. It’s not having the attitude that I need to continuously improve and keep it there. That’s the key.” Haber added, “Even the 5 percent—in my mind it only takes one or two people who are not going to identify something that can really hurt you or really hurt the organization.”

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Nuclear Security & Deterrence Vol. 18 No. 22
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Nuclear Security & Deterrence Monitor

Article 8 of 12

May 30, 2014

DNFSB Member Stresses ‘Leadership’ in Ensuring Strong Safety Culture

By Todd Jacobson

Board Hears from Experts on How To Assess and Address Culture Issues

Mike Nartker
NS&D Monitor
5/30/2014

As the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board begins gearing up to take a new look at whether workers across the Department of Energy complex feel safe to raise concerns, one Board member warned this week that there is no "magic bullet" for ensuring a strong safety culture, and instead stressed the necessity of "leadership." DNFSB Member Sean Sullivan made his remarks during a Board meeting held in Washington intended to give the Board a chance to hear from an industry expert, as well as representatives from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and NASA, on various ways to assess and address safety culture issues. Sullivan, though, appeared to be highly skeptical at the onset of the meeting. "As I understand the purpose of this hearing, we’re supposed to be gathering information that may be used in a subsequent hearing with the Department of Energy to enlighten them on ways to improve their safety culture. To be honest, I don’t believe anyone can say anything—myself included—in this room in the next few hours that could fulfill that purpose," he said in his opening remarks.

Choosing to not ask questions during the course of the meeting, Sullivan instead used his closing remarks to emphasize his view of the importance of "leadership" in ensuring workers feel they can raise issues without fear. Noting his background in the U.S. Navy, where he served as a submarine officer, Sullivan said that while the Navy has "a very strong safety culture … we don’t have a definition of safety culture. We don’t have any action matrices or frameworks or tool kits. It comes down, in the Navy, to leadership."

He went on to say, "There is no magic bullet. When you try to figure out how we maximize safety on a submarine, well the easy answer would be just tie the ships up to the pier. But that doesn’t get the mission done. Similarly we could maximize safety at Pantex if we simply stopped managing the stockpile, but that won’t work either." Sullivan added, "These are difficult decisions, and the answer is not found in a tool kit. It can’t be taught in a one week course. You can’t come up with the magic bullet."

DNFSB Recommendation Puts ‘Emphasis on Process’

The DNFSB has long been interested in the state of the safety culture across the DOE complex. The topic was the subject of a formal Recommendation issued in 2011 that warned of a "flawed" safety culture at one of the Department’s largest projects—the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant—and also called on DOE to perform reviews to see if safety culture concerns existed at other projects. Since then, a number of DOE reviews have found safety culture concerns at a variety of sites and projects, and the Department has been working to make improvements through measures such as increased training. Explaining the purpose of this week’s meeting, DNFSB Chairman Peter Winokur told NS&D Monitor, "Basically where we’re at is we want to re-evaluate Recommendation 2011-1. We want to make sure the implementation is proceeding smoothly, and that it’s achieving the desired results." Winokur added, "I think DOE has taken a lot of very positive action [in response to] Recommendation 2011-1. What we want to verify is whether or not that action is going to result in significantly improved safety culture."

When asked on the sidelines of this week’s meeting if DOE was too focused, however, on process in attempting to improve safety culture, Sullivan said, "I think the reaction to the Recommendation that the Board made inherently will put an emphasis on the process. That’s not to criticize the Recommendation. We wrote a Recommendation, then it becomes an implementation plan under the rules, so now there’s a plan. So now it becomes did we check the boxes on a plan?" He told NS&D Monitor, "I would say that there is danger in putting emphasis on process because then it becomes about the process."

‘What Decisions Are Being Made … Day-to-Day?’

Sullivan stressed the need for managers to be able explain their decision-making to workers as a key element of ensuring workers at DOE sites feel they can raise concerns. "I’m not interested at all in what they’re doing for training courses, or what they’re doing for surveys or any of that. I’m more interested in, hey what decisions are being made on a day-to-day basis? If you put yourself in the shoes of a worker who is in the complex, what message do they take out of these decisions? And is the message communicated?" he told NS&D Monitor. "It doesn’t mean that the decision is wrong—the decision may stack up all of the factors and say yes absolutely, this is the right answer. But if it’s not communicated so that they understand someone decides to move forward with a particular production plan despite a safety objection that was raised, that may be the right answer. But if we don’t communicate why that was the right answer, then the worker will just draw their own conclusions, and the conclusion they will draw is that they don’t care about my safety."

Does DOE Definition Send Right Message?

During the course of this week’s meeting, Winkour raised the question of what signals DOE may be sending with its definition of safety culture. "The definition of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations says safety is an overriding priority. But the Department of Energy’s definition is more balanced, is more in terms of the balance of the mission and safety." Winokur said. "You’re trying to change the behavior of your workforce to hopefully improve your safety culture. And you’re hearing the message from up high, from management, and one message from the NRC may be safety is an overriding priority. That’s clearly stated in the definition of safety culture. And another organization, your core value … says you balance mission and safety. Is it meaningfully different to the workers to hear those two different message?"

Sonja Haber of the Human Performance Analysis Corporation said she did not think there was a significant difference in the definitions. "I don’t think so if the leadership implements the model for safety and behavior change in the appropriate way. I think what happens is that often we take that overriding priority to an extreme on either side. I think there has to be a balance to some extent." In response to a question from DNFSB Vice Chair Jessie Roberson on how to balance "mission" and "safety," Haber said the two are not "mutually exclusive," adding, "You would want your mission-directed behaviors not to intervene with your safety directed behaviors. They really are not independent or mutually exclusive, and you often need some of those same behaviors, just perhaps focused in a different way."

‘Continuous Improvement’ Should be Goal, Expert Says

Winokur also asked during the meeting what is the best way to gauge safety culture at a specific site or project, citing as an example a survey that may show 95 percent of workers feel comfortable raising concerns. "If I told you that 95 percent of the people in this room would get home safely tonight, no one would agree with that right? And we don’t permit 95 percent of the jets to make it safely to the airports they’re going to. But we would permit 95 percent to land on time. So do what these numbers really mean to us? What are we looking for in terms of establishing this culture?" Winokur said.

The goal should be "continuous improvement," Haber said "I think the goal for me is not the number so much as the desire or the behavior to want to continue to improve." she said. "One of the leading indicators of a safety culture that will start declining is complacency. It’s the idea that ok I’m at 95 percent, that’s as good as it gets, so I can just coast along there. It’s that attitude. It’s not getting the 100 percent. It’s not having the attitude that I need to continuously improve and keep it there. That’s the key." Haber added, "Even the 5 percent—in my mind it only takes one or two people who are not going to identify something that can really hurt you or really hurt the organization."

Comments are closed.