The safety significant and safety class ventilation and confinement systems used at the Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (LANL) Technical Area 55 (TA-55) plutonium facility to mitigate the risk of accidental radioactive material release are generally reliable but exhibit some shortcomings in internal procedures and management, according to a Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Enterprise Assessments review released earlier this month. The Aug. 7 review found that the ventilation and confinement systems at the PF-4, the main plutonium processing facility (currently on hiatus), “have demonstrated a high level of reliability in recent years, despite the age of most of the equipment.” The confinement function, the report says, “is essential for mitigating accident consequences,” particularly in case of “accidental release of radioactive material.”
The report notes that TA-55 “has a mature and effective maintenance program” and the “PF-4 ventilation systems are well maintained,” but that “many of the PF-4 Safety [structures, systems and components] are beyond their design life expectancy.” Some of these components “in some cases are obsolete and replacement parts can no longer be obtained,” it says. The report says the lab is working “to upgrade and revitalize” these structures, systems, and components “through the multiple phases of the TA-55 Re-Investment Project,” which is meant to extend the life of the facility. The assessment also found that due to issues with technical safety requirement procedure implementation, “there is no assurance that the untested functions of the safety related ventilation system will perform as expected to mitigate the consequences of analyzed accidents.” It further cited issues “in the training and qualification of equipment operators, maintenance personnel, and key managers and supervisors.” LANL seeks to resume operations at PF-4 by the end of fiscal 2016 after criticality safety issues shut down the facility in 2013.