Brian Bradley
NS&D Monitor
8/22/2014
After completing in July an Analysis of Alternatives for the ICBM leg of the nuclear triad, the Air Force has reportedly settled on a “hybrid” model, which would incorporate the fundamental design, communication structure and existing launch silos for the Minuteman III while swapping out older rocket motors and antiquated guidance systems. An Aug. 19 Nextgov article citing anonymous sources states that the Air Force plans to replace by 2030 the existing 450 Minuteman IIIs with up to 420 of the future single-warhead ICBMs, which are expected to include pinpoint-accurate solid-state guidance systems and a mobile capability.
Peter Huessy, Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council, lauded the mobile capability, but said high cost estimates could dissuade officials from fully installing the mobile framework in the near future. “You’re probably going to need a security car or truck along with the launch vehicle as well as a communications vehicle, because somebody’s got to give a command to launch the rocket,” Huessy said. “It involves a number of added personnel that makes it expensive.” Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, said mobility only becomes relevant in a country where that has far fewer ICBMs than the U.S. currently maintains, when protection would become paramount.
Huessy said a precision solid-state single warhead could also be more effective than a city-busting electromagnetically powered MIRV. “The utility of the 10-megaton weapon has diminished over time,” said retired Maj. Gen. Don Alston, former commander of the 20th Air Force. “[T]o be able to achieve the effects that you want with fewer weapons, that’s a common sense thing. You’d like to be able to achieve these effects and hold at risk and create deterrence by holding at risk targets with fewer numbers of nuclear weapons.”
A Willingness to Spend Money?
The last time the Air Force explored a land-based strategic deterrent option was in the early portion of the George W. Bush administration, according to Kristensen, who added that the current hybrid concept appears to resemble the concept developed in the early 2000s, especially in terms of targeting, responsiveness and payload capacities. Because of financial constraints, Kristensen predicted the development of the Minuteman III’s successor to somewhat follow a life-extension path. “Neither in the nation as a whole, nor in the Air Force within its own budget, I think, is there a willingness to spend too much money on this,” Kristensen said. “That doesn’t mean this is not a priority seen by some. … I think it’s more likely that we’re going to see another round of life extension of the Minuteman III with whatever that will entail, than some new exotic mobile system rolling out of a barrack somewhere.”
Alston said the Minuteman III guidance systems were refreshed during the past decade, and he cited a necessity to act upon the AoA to establish the proper timing, budgeting and programming to minimize the nation’s national security risk. While solid-state guidance systems are expected to cost $1.7 million less per unit than their electromagnetic predecessors, the Nextgov article points to budget documents which show a $28 million spending gap which is expected to delay the development of the next-gen targeting systems by two years. Contractors Boeing, General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin each have reportedly requested government equipment to build the new systems, and none are expected to invest company funds to convert commercial solid-state systems to military-compatible structures.
Air Force Declines to Comment
While the AoA awaits Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s approval to move forward with development, Global Strike Command officials have declined to comment. “The GBSD Analysis of Alternatives final report is still pre-decisional and has not yet been validated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Capability Assessment and Program Evaluation Division,” said command spokesperson Kathryn Blais. “Therefore, to ensure consistency, we cannot get out ahead of OSD’s official decision on the way ahead for GBSD.”
While declining to speak directly about the AoA at the U.S. Strategic Command Deterrence Symposium last week, Strategic Command chief Adm. Cecil Haney underscored the importance of maintaining a credible deterrent, and said replacing current U.S. ICBMs with a ground-based system “is a requirement in order to have the right foundational strategic capability for our country.” Huessy has said members inside the defense community have maintained a notion that, while the Minuteman III regularly passes its tests, it “could” fail.
Development of solid-state guidance systems is estimated to cost $800,000 a unit, while development of old-generation mechanical guidance systems costs about $2.5 million apiece, according to Nextgov. “We wouldn’t want to bind ourselves to technology that already is a generation old,” Alston said. “It just doesn’t make any logical sense that you would strap yourself to capabilities or deny yourself the enhancements that sound like enhancements today, but will be just rudimentary a generation from now.”
