Jeremy L. Dillon and Kenneth Fletcher
RW Monitor
9/12/2014
The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission voiced its support this week for Ontario Power Generation’s proposed radioactive waste inventory verification plan for its proposed deep geologic repository for low and intermediate radioactive waste during a public hearing on OPG’s license request. Earlier this year, a former employee of OPG publicly criticized the waste inventory plan for failing to address some waste forms that would go in the repository, and in response, the company re-worked and verified its results that proved that those waste forms would not change the safety results for the DGR. OPG presented these results at the public hearing this week, with CNSC confirming their results. “In light of our review, CNSC staff concludes that the proposed radioactive waste inventory verification plan addresses all but one expectation that CNSC staff laid out in recommendations regarding uncertainties in the original radioactive waste inventory plan,” said Patsy Thompson, CNSC director general for the Directorate of Environmental and Radiation Protection and Assessment. “The updated radioactive waste inventory that includes measurements of activities in pressure tubes and garter springs does not significantly change: 1) the assessment that long term doses to people an iota, 2) the dose predictions to workers as long as mitigation measures are in place, and finally dose predictions to workers in the event of an accident. OPG’s proposed radioactive waste inventory verification plan is acceptable to CNSC staff, as it meets regulatory requirements.”
Frank Greening, the former employee who questioned the waste inventory, reiterated his claims this week during the hearing that the calculations for the DGR did not accurately estimate the waste’s true values. He alleged that OPG was more interested in “skimping on the costs” by using estimations instead of testing actual waste levels in a true waste characterization. OPG’s presentation, though, dismissed that the changes affected the overall safety case of the repository. “While the amount of radionuclides in some waste streams were underestimated compared with current estimates, these are less important radionuclides in terms of potential impacts,” said Paul Gierszewski, OPG’s engineering authority fur nuclear waste management. “There is no change in the overall safety case.”
OPG is currently in the midst of a two-week public hearing process before the federal Joint Review Panel responsible for deciding if the repository should move to a construction phase. The public hearing step of the process appeared to be completed last fall, but the federal panel decided to conduct additional hearings starting this week to address outstanding issues, among them: how the ongoing shutdown of the U.S. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant affects the repository, which was the topic of discussion earlier this week, as well as the waste inventory verification plan. The CNSC also endorsed that the project receive the government’s approval to move forward. “In addition, the pre- and post-closure safety assessments are sufficiently conservative to support an environmental assessment decision and to authorize a site-preparation construction license,” Thompson said.
The proposed repository would be located beneath OPG’s Bruce nuclear facility in Kincardine, Ont. OPG plans on storing low and intermediate waste from its Bruce, Pickering, and Darlington power stations at the proposed repository, which would be located 680 meters (approximately 744 yards) below the surface in an isolated rock formation of shale and limestone. After the public comment period, the review panel will submit an environmental assessment report within 90 days to the federal Minister of the Environment with its recommendations for the path forward. Once the federal government gives the go-ahead, the review panel can issue a license to prepare a site and construct the facility.
Will WIPP Problems Affecting Licensing?
Earlier in the week, the Joint Review Panel questioned OPG on how incidents that occurred earlier this year at WIPP, which included a radiological release, would affect its own repository planning efforts. OPG and CNSC pointed to the U.S. Department of Energy’s multiple roles at WIPP as “potentially problematic.” Kathleen Klassen of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission said that though DOE is the owner and designer of WIPP, it is also the operator through its contractor and has established standards the facility must comply with. “So the DOE implements the regulations that they have established and must demonstrate the adequacy of this implementation to themselves,” Klassen said. “This is potentially problematic because there may be a lack of impartiality and an inability to separate roles. DOE is the operator, and as a regulator must also coordinate and comply with other regulatory bodies.”
However, WIPP is somewhat of an exception among DOE facilities, the majority of which are self-regulated. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has the authority to issue final regulations to dispose of transuranic waste, and also determines whether WIPP complies with federal health and safety standards. New Mexico’s Environment Department also has regulatory oversight, as well as the Mine Safety and Health Administration. DOE did not respond to request for comment this week regarding the Canadian comments.
Ontario Power Generation would be the owner and operator of the proposed repository while it would be regulated independently by CNSC, Klassen said. Regulation of WIPP, which is overseen by DOE and a host of federal and state regulators, can be a concern because of the “multijurisdictional authorities and difficulties within DOE’s organization in understanding which role they are engaged in, i.e. being regulated or the regulator cooperating with another regulator,” according to Klassen. “This framework can also make the effective oversight and control of contractors more difficult as there may be differences in the expectation of the contractor between DOE the regulator, and DOE the operator managing the contractor. When problems occur with this type of framework it can lead to ineffective regulation and ineffective operation and a failure of the overall institution to ensure safety.”
